Club owners’ already in possession, or entrepreneurs keen to join the owners’ ‘family’ are in desperate need to value their business periodically. The previous part, focused on the Discounted Cash Flow model with Slavia Prague as an exampl, shed a light on the problematic nature of football markets and why state-of-the-art valuation methods often fall short in this business, or in sport more broadly.

Next up. Revenue.

One could argue the key company metric. Without revenue, there’s no need to save costs, you simply can’t afford to have costs at all.

The methodology behind the revenue-multiple method is quite simple: you multiply the annual revenue by a certain number to arrive at the estimated valuation.

The question: Is there an approximate universal multiplier for any club in any league?

Yes and no.

Revenue is only half a Story

The yes answer to the previous question has a value of 4.

In the following scatter plot, the relationship between clubs’ estimated valuation and respective total revenue for the pre-takeover period is shown.

Valuations can be either:

• estimated by media - LAFC,

• calculated using proxy market capitalisation - SL Benfica,

• copied from takeover price - Chelsea FC, or

• inferred from purchase price of less than 100% of shares - AS Roma.

Unfortunately, the variation of this simple linear model is quite high. It’s perfect that we can assign revenue multiples ex post; however, club owners need to know the value today — before tomorrow’s takeover.

MLS clubs like LAFC can’t be mixed with European clubs, especially due to the unique factors of US & Canada sports leagues. In the case of LAFC, the simple fact of playing in a closed league generates a revenue multiple within the 9–10 range — more than double the standard. On top of that having extensive support from Latin-American citizens as well as the upcoming generation also helps.

For enterprises that are not yet profitable or whose earnings are inconsistent, revenue multiples emphasise future opportunities over current profitability. A true startups.

On average, football clubs’ values are four times the amount of their current total annual revenue. This is on the low end in comparison to other industries: high operational costs, fluctuating revenue, and embedded uncertainty leading to higher overall risk. This valuation discount can often be a reason why owning football clubs might seem like a good way to diversify a portfolio of the very wealthy or investment funds — provided the owner is not, in fact, risk-averse.

During Covid the reality for many clubs around the world was clear: how to keep the ball rolling. Any valuation estimates around the year 2020 would miss the reality quite a bit. Period from 2019 to 2021 deserves its own special valuation model.

The Rest is Risk

The risk is simply still there — and for smaller football enterprises even more prevalent.

Smaller or mid-table clubs with rich histories, playing in the top tiers of the European football league system, often fail to generate Free Cash Flow (FCF) consistently each season. This is why previously discussed Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) method isn’t well suited to this industry. For initial estimation, enterprise value divided by a club’s annual revenue comes in handy.

Some football revenue is certain — except during major world events. Additional revenue can also be relatively secure if the club can rely on a loyal fanbase that will not abandon their colours the first time the team enters a difficult period results-wise. If the season’s kit design is at least slightly different from generic catalogue offerings, it gives that revenue certainty a small boost.

Broadcasting revenue depends on broadcasting deals and, of course, on whether the club secures participation in European competitions and/or plays near the top of the table. For mid-table clubs, broadcasting income can even be the most predictable element, as leagues are locked into multi-year agreements. Changes in player contracts and revenue from player sales are the opposite of predictable.

A club’s fundamental financial health can’t be determined by one metric alone. This is why both revenue multiples and operating income, or EBIT, work best in combination. But historical revenue — especially from continuing operations — remains the strongest predictor of long-term value.

Beyond Profits & Losses

But again, it would not be wise to have one metric only to determine the value of reality. Your value would equal how much you make, not what you do. The most noble things often go unmonetised or unnoticed. A sports club’s value is often a play of multiple factors that exceed financials. This is not a rational business at first glance, at least not yet. If it was, sports investment funds would already be established within financial markets.

However, subtle hints that sport is growing into a respectable asset class can be seen through the recent rapid changes in ownership structures and the “celebrity” status that comes with them. Political scientists call it sportswashing; economists call it economic rationality.

In the end, the analysis demonstrates that a modern football club is a paradox. It is both a sophisticated, multi-billion-pound global business and a living, breathing emotional entity. The full picture includes the club’s heritage: its history, its community, and the emotional connection that defines its fanbase. Working with the local community is the first step. The masses come afterwards.

👉 Follow-Up in Part Three

The story is more complex and thus deserves multivariate models for club valuations.

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The economics of football clubs could be a topic for an entirely dedicated Substack page. As football is the world’s number one sport, it deserves reasonable coverage on Škvára as well. There are many intangible assets connected with owning or supporting any football club: the full emotional rollercoaster of excitement, wonder, love, sadness, anger, even apathy. Then there are families, friendships, broader cultural involvement, fashion, architecture, weekly rituals, the travel industry for those European nights, and last but not least, food. Connecting all of this with clubs’ financials would give a fuller picture of a football club’s economic valuation.

But for now, let’s focus only on the money.

To Maximise or To Minimise?

Maximise Profits or minimise Losses? For professional football clubs relying on repeated money injections from their respective owners, the latter is often more prevalent. Still, in either case, clubs tend to maximise overall shareholder value, at least in the long term. They do, however, choose different means to pursue this difficult task.

This article is not about the incentives of football club owners—if you are looking for more comprehensive research on that, see my Master’s Thesis.

👉 Read it here

If we set up a KPI to maximise, it inevitably needs to be measured. So the ultimate question remains:

How do we measure the monetary value of a football club?

How else would potential buyers know what they are getting for their pennies?

Discounted Cash Flow is (Maybe) Not the Way

Despite being a well-established and well-researched method within corporate finance, DCF does not fully capture the reality of the football industry. Risk-seeking behaviour of club owners, the inherent uncertainty of sport leading to volatile revenues, player-market inflation, and the variability of profit or loss from player trading all work against relying on this approach.

Let’s build up our case study from the 2023 financial statement of Slavia Prague.

EBITDA

The root, the almighty, the influential EBITDA: Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation, and Amortisation. This figure serves as the foundation for all future calculations within the DCF model, with the next step being Free Cash Flow. The football market – not only the player market – is worth studying in detail. There is room both for free-trade economic liberalism and for more levelling policies, such as wage caps or parachute payments. Since sport is the core of these businesses, the market remains highly unpredictable. There are, however, a few constants: one is Financial Fair Play (FFP) regulations, the other is taxation.

These are the building bricks:

• Total Revenue: 1 297 788 000 CZK
  Revenue provides the top-line measure of a club’s economic strength and is the starting point for profitability analysis.

• Wages: 95 482 000 CZK
  One of the largest recurring expenses, directly linked to competitiveness on the pitch.

• Operating Costs including Player Wages: 1 162 784 000 CZK
  These reflect the heavy burden of running a club beyond salaries, covering logistics, staff, and day-to-day operations.

• Amortisation: 196 950 000 CZK
  Critical in football finance, as transfer fees are spread across the length of player contracts.

• Depreciation: 5 559 000 CZK
  Represents the wearing out of physical assets, such as stadiums and facilities.

• Costs without D&A: 1 055 757 000 CZK
  Strips out non-cash charges, useful for assessing operating efficiency.

EBITDA ≈ 242 031 000 CZK
Calculated as Revenue minus Costs without D&A. A key profitability indicator, EBITDA shows the cash-generating ability of the club before financing and accounting adjustments.

It must be noted that this figure is based on personal interpretation of the financial statements. By no means was or is it the true SK Slavia Prague EBITDA for 2023.

EBIT = 39 522 000 CZK
Includes D&A and reflects operating profit, crucial for tax calculation.

Net Operating Profit After Tax (NOPAT) = 32 013 000 CZK
Reveals profit left after taxation, indicating genuine operating efficiency. In Czechia, corporate tax stands at 19%.

• + D&A: 202 509 000 CZK
  Adding back depreciation and amortisation corrects for non-cash items that reduce accounting profit but not cash flow.

• – CapEx estimation: 5 559 000 CZK
  Capital expenditure maintains long-term assets, ensuring operational sustainability.

• – Change in Working Capital: –37 362 000 CZK
  A reduction in working capital frees up cash, signalling improved liquidity.

Thus, the Free Cash Flow (FCF) is calculated as:

Not including player trading in this FCF calculation shows the operating-only DCF result at 266 325 000 CZK. However, FCF itself is not sufficient for a complete DCF valuation, since clubs are not perpetuum cash machines – a certain discount rate must always be applied to the future outlook.

Weighted Average Cost of Capital - WACC

The exact formula for WACC is:

where:

• E = Market value of equity

• D = Market value of debt

• Re = Cost of equity

• Rd = Cost of debt

• T = Corporate tax rate

We want, in fact, to find the market valuation of the club. This requires making certain assumptions in order to estimate the discount rate.

• Capital structure: Equity-heavy club, with reliance on owners’ funding → 85% equity, 15% debt

• Cost of equity: On the higher end due to volatility in revenue and transfer operations → 15%

• Cost of debt: Based on Czech business loan interest rates at the time → 5%

• Corporate tax rate: 19%

• Risk premium: Add a general sports-club premium of 2% to reflect the uncertainty of sporting results

From these assumptions, the estimated WACC comes out at approximately 15%.

Growth Rate g

Further assumptions must be made about the club’s outlook, market trends affecting revenues, player trading, and overall economic performance.

1. Club Performance - steady position among the top spots in the Czech league, repeated qualification for European competitions, development of women’s football and the academy → +1.5% contribution to g

2. Market Trends - revenue growth from increased TV rights and sponsorships, with Czechia still at the lower end of the TV rights market → +1.5% contribution to g

3. Player Market Inflation - based on CIES calculations1, between 2013 and 2023 transfer-market inflation averaged 9% annually; with player signings representing around 10–20% of revenue → +1.5% contribution to g

4. Macroeconomic Conditions - GDP growth and inflation rate → +0.5% contribution to g

5. Future Stadium and Fan Service Improvements → +0.5% contribution to g

Taking all these factors into account, the club is assumed to grow at a sustainable rate of ~5.5%.

Would you add any other factors?

Leave a comment

Final Calculation of DCF Model

With all the key elements in place, the road is now open to estimating the enterprise value using FCF, WACC, and the growth rate.

Therefore, our simplified DCF model estimates the Enterprise Value of Slavia Prague to be:

2 957 609 000 CZK

This aligns with the usual story that the EV is above the takeover amount, which for Slavia was estimated at around 2 billion CZK2. On the other hand, current market conditions and internal pressures on both future and previous owners may have contributed to a lower final price.

But stop and consider all the assumptions that had to be made to arrive at this final number. There is always the possibility of focusing on each assumption and inflating the model further. However, attempting to explain assumptions about the future only creates more assumptions about the future.

This is where more direct valuation methods have their place, even though they also incorporate some of the very same assumptions highlighted in this DCF overview.

👉 Follow-Up in Part Two

Next, I will discuss another method for valuing football clubs:

Revenue Multiples – I (maybe) promise fewer formulas and more reading.

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Footnotes & Further Reading

Messi miss

This was the second peak, right after the Euro 2016 quarter-finals.

To draw with Argentina.

No more words to say — we remember what it meant for them, with 10% of the population right there, at the World Cup.

What made this nation unite behind sports? Why were they an inspiration to ultra groups around Europe to mimic their ‘Viking’ clap?

In 2023 Iceland allocated approximately 3.3%1 of total government expenditures towards sports and other recreational services — more than any other country within European Economic Area (EEA).

It’s all about the people

In the economic justification for such sport funding, the public must be on par with what the government has in mind. The longer the policy is active, the more probable it is for the society to jump on track with it. And it seems like the Icelandic people not only jumped on track - they took their sport identity by storm. This brings us back to the most important factor in any efficient public policy: there has to be human capital developed, or at least developing, to be able to fulfil set goals. Icelanders did just that. And of course, ultimately, some historical milestones may have helped.

In the most recent dataset from Eurostat for sport participation, Iceland is up there in the top quantile. Compared to the EU27 average, regular activity isn’t something people here are afraid of. But what is behind all this activeness?

If you have a research question, ask Reddit. For sure, with the respondent sample in mind, few interesting ideas popped up.

The story starts in the 2000s, when the government was facing a long-term problem with teenage binge drinking. In such a small society, it is easier to focus on these problems — and they also spread much faster. As a counter-force to drinking, the Icelandic government chose a different motivator.

This was achieved partly through encouraging kids to participate in organized hobbies like sports.2

- Reddit

Frístundakort

This is rather special case of public policy specialising in children’s sport. Frístundakort - the “recreation” card - allows children aged 6-18 from all socioeconomic background to participate in after-school sport activities. These habits then transfer into adulthood. The subsidy (75k ISK) can cover basic annual clubs’ fees. The question is: what is the impact of this subsidy on the prices of connected services and goods — training fees, travel, clothing, etc.? Depends on:

The aim is for all children and young people in Reykjavík ages 6-18 to be able to participate in recreational activities regardless of their economic and social circumstances. The Recreation Card is intended to increase equality in society and diversity in the practice of sports, arts, and leisure activities.

- Reykjavík website

The country is small and ethnically uniform; thus, transaction costs in establishing any common goals are lower. A smaller community also creates stronger network effects within the economy, speeding up the process of the “multiplication” of positive externalities. Information transfers quickly and efficiently, unlike in more diverse, politically unstable, or simply larger countries prone to ‘Chinese Whispers’. The financial crisis may also have played a role through encouraging participation in more ‘economical’ sports like running, gym, and football. In years of higher unemployment, some groups of people could kick-off similar shifts in sports participation as seen after the COVID-19 lockdowns.

Indoor Mania

Outdoor heated turfs, indoor halls, and other necessary infrastructure were essential to kick off the football craze. How else would you be able to tackle the geographic and meteorological nuances of living in Iceland? A natural experiment in its purest form. It is debatable whether the success stories of Iceland’s national team during the 2010s can be attributed to this unprecedented infrastructure3. But for the current and future generations, it is considered a symbol of the Icelandic transition in sports as a whole, and of the football body – KSÍ (Knattspyrnusamband Íslands) in particular.

All of these ‘soccer houses’ come with one small detail: they cost a lot to run – far more than a regular grass pitch in Central Europe. Operational costs for this immobile capital take up a significant chunk of the government’s sports expenditure.

What is in there for other countries?

Media coverage of Iceland during the Euros and the World Cup reached unprecedented highs. The country is just waiting for another major success to revisit these topics on the global stage. But the mills are still running even today. Was the golden football generation solely the product of politics emphasising an active lifestyle? Professionalism grew, and so did the players. There are possibly more sporting accomplishments cooking for the Icelanders. Recent shifts in Iceland’s UEFA Country Ranking for club competitions might give us the clue.

The crucial problems in reproducing such politics in other countries are:

• Scalability: larger population → more interest groups → less consensus.

• Current sports habits of different social groups: what if the country simply doesn’t have the resources – be it financial, logistical, or biological?

• Other – more relevant – society-wide pressing issues.

• Shape of the demand curve for children’s sport: if inelastic, no reason for intervention.

• Geography.

On the other hand, the inspiration-worthy challenges Iceland overcame:

• It’s all about cross-government partnerships. The state, regions, and municipalities should have at least compatible views and programmes around sports subsidies for the young generation.

• Infrastructure with economics in mind first: multipurpose halls and pitches instead of purpose-built facilities. Using what already exists, instead of waiting for new things to come.

• Climate in mind.

And most importantly.

It all begins with the kids.

What might be biggest Icelandic takeaway for your country?

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Footnotes & Further Reading

In the debate around sport financing, there may not be enough emphasis on the place where sport is most vulnerable: at the beginning.

Focus is on the professionals

In sports economics, the overall understanding of public subsidies for professional sports is clear. No national arena, nor Olympics is able to cover the government subsidisation through the economic benefits within the city and neighbourhoods. Many studies have shown that these benefits are acquired only by very targeted subjects. Athletes - obviously - but also local small businesses, infrastructure developers, sports agencies, etc. have gained relatively more from such mega-projects than the public in general. Professional sport is, by definition, professional. It's meant to remain more privately owned.

It's not true that the Paris Olympics or development of Stadion Narodowy in Warsaw have not created any positive side-effects. Some form of subsidies are justifiable, but those projects often relied on state funding of more than 50%. We are all sport fans; however, we see these projects differently. If only economists were to run national sports agencies, nothing of this scale would be organised or built and sports clubs would carefully calculate ROI of increases in stadiums' capacity by 10s, not 1000s.

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But! Now shift our minds to today’s football training session.

Coach said no balls today

The compressor’s broken.

Interpretation of government costs changes with respect to amateur sport. Sport is crucial for children's development. Benefits from attending sports clubs by youngsters are often observed later, even for those who don't follow with a professional career in sport. Sense of motivation, perseverance, grit, success and failure in sport often prepare them for future life's ups and downs. But here we are now, the kids are still young. Some of the mentioned benefits come earlier, some of them come late. We know they will, but the families of those kids may not, at least immediately.

Governments in the EU spend approximately 0.8%1 of their total expenditures on recreational & sporting services on average. Iceland is worth a separate post.

→ If the families' tax payments would decrease by 0.8%, thus disposable income would increase, and parents would maybe not see their kid's future in professional sport, would they all be willing to pay the full price for training, equipment and bus trips to neighbouring villages? Would sports participation increase or decrease? This is not only true for children, is it? The benefits from this participation are applicable for all ages and for all sports, even recreational hiking and cycling. But the future generation is in this topic the most important.

Of course, there are cases where being part of a bad group pushes you to make bad choices. But we can agree that for children who can, sport or anything else more physically demanding will always be better than pursuing, let's say, less wanted pastimes. Also for society as a whole. And with that, government and city council subsidies to local sport clubs or investments into sport infrastructure are (reasonably) justified.

Where is EU’s place in sport then?

Because sport should be accessible for all, the EU steps in2. Next to regional and state governments. European Regional Development Fund or programmes like Erasmus+ might have played their part in enhancing sport experience in your local town or village. Be it new seats for the small stand behind one of the goals, running water in locker room showers or volleyball nets for the sand pitch nearby. These small projects make the lives of village sport heroes that much better and make sport that more inviting overall.

This is a sports economics publication, thus it is our duty to think more in terms of economic effectiveness. Sport subsidies in terms of amateur sport are justifiable, but the justification itself has its limits. Research is on this ambivalent depending on the efficiency measures chosen34. Nothing is worse than an unused cycling path for the price of millions of € per kilometre.

And do not forget potential corruption behaviours.

How to measure the impact of sport subsidies?

The methodology possibilities for determining this economic viability are endless. Here is a snapshot of what current sports economics uses:

1. Cost-Benefit Analysis

2. Econometric Analysis

3. Case studies, Survey methods

4. Game Theory, Optimisation Models

5. Public Choice Analysis

With that, back to the studio.

We have the tools indeed. We apply them on a case-by-case basis, but literature on subsidising amateur sport is for now limited. But from what we know, we can say that they do help, to an unspecified degree. There are unspoken rules to get the money where it's most needed, that no exact redistribution table can replace. We must find those rules. It's in our best interest, so the government bill is nothing but pharmacy expenses.

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Footnotes & Further Reading

City officials send an official bid, add documentation on the current state of local sports infrastructure and year-round sporting events. ACES representatives then come visit the place, and a decision is made. Annualy, multiple cities and towns are awarded the titles: European Town of Sport (for towns up to 25k inhabitants), European City of Sport (for cities between 25k an 500k inhabitants), European Capital of Sport (awarded to one city), among others.

What economic value do these awards actually carry?

Is the award a prerequisite for increased funding of local sports clubs and venues if this new ‘sticker’ is now assigned to the city? Or is the title about validation only? Could it inspire people to move there envisioning an active lifestyle for themselves and their children? Or is it just another award (tool) for policymakers to increase their chances of serving another term?

Let’s focus on the core economic components of these cities, as they are assessed on criteria such as sports infrastructure, enabling movement for citizens of all ages, experience in organising prestigious international and/or regional sports competitions.

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Spending on sport. But how much?

The main driver of sports development in any city is public and private investment synergy. In best scenario, the multi-layered sporting, economic, social and urban goals of local clubs can’t collide with politicians’ views on city’s future. The key to effective partnerships are transfers from public institutions which, depending on the size of clubs, may cover a large amount of clubs’ budgets. The percentages of city budgets assigned to the development of local sports also differ based on city size. Usually, the larger the city, the lower the percentage. Smaller towns tend to subsidy clubs using between 2-3%12 of their budget. Larger between 1-2%.3

There currently is no verification of the hypothesis that expenditures on sports facilities and public funding for sports clubs—as a percentage of the city budget—differ for cities with and without those European … of Sport titles. This research would require thorough categorising of each chosen city’s expenditures. Transparent council accounting will hopefully be a norm in the future. Currently, there are tools for the analysis of public procurements that could leverage automatic tagging for sport-related agreements.

The titles have more of a multiplicative effect: they support what was, rather than create what wasn’t.

All coins have two sides

Cost-Benefit Analysis (without numbers) of acquiring the title for your city in summary:

1. The Title Itself

➕ Commitment to sport for all; excellent for marketing and media.

➖ Raised expectations create risk of broken promises.

2. EU Cooperation

➕ Access to funding and partnership opportunities.

➖ Complex bureaucracy and compliance requirements.

3. Public Sports Infrastructure

➕ Long-term public good and community benefits.

➖ High upfront costs and maintenance burden (CapEx, OpEx); risk of underutilised facilities if not well managed.

4. Private Sector

➕ New sponsorships; increased public spending.

➖ Dependence on public spending.

5. Macroeconomic Impact

➕ Higher property values and local business growth; stimulates sports tourism and related economic sectors (hospitality, retail).

➖ Risks from poorly planned continuous stakeholder engagement.

6. Public Engagement and Demographic Effects

➕ Higher public interest to take part in local active lifestyle; may increase city immigration.

➖ Citizens may not understand or value the initiative if sport hasn’t been a topic before.

Sports infrastructure from the sky

The cities are evolving. What was a rough football pitch with rusty goalposts just a minute ago is now a modern, floodlight-lit astroturf. New playgrounds for kids have more versatility than your local gym equipment. The best way to see where the money is flowing is to look for clues in satellite imagery. Sports investment is a long-term game, but due to positive externalities, it is a game to be played.

Why did Marbella become the go-to place for top-tier football clubs during their pre-season? Apart from its geography and climate, it was the public-private cooperation that led to the development of football centres in the 2000s. The relatively new Banús Football Center is one example. Marbella became such a haven for football clubs because the city council enabled the private funding of such infrastructure.

The changes within public space can sometimes feel a bit unseen from the outside, but they burden the city accounts nevertheless. In Tábor, Czechia, a new town sports hall was opened in 2021, but more upgrades (sustainable energy, parking lots) were also made to the nearby athletics stadium and its surrounding buildings.

Where to next?

Just pick a city for a round trip, buy a beer and sausage at their Sunday League game, support the love of locals for the occasion. Visit grandparents and take them to a local park, see how people spend time outside. Eating, drinking and/or sports. Or exercise.

People use public space to take on sporting activities, thus it is in the public interest to shape surroundings so more and more people (and future ones) can do so as well. Titles such as European City of Sport aren’t an empty promise. They shape the city’s reputation. They help in securing more funding for sport-related projects. And then, it is up to the stakeholders to determine effective ways to put the finances to good use—weighing the opportunity costs for the city, for respective business owners, sponsors and themselves.

In the European context, the EU is this game’s key player, especially via The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)4. But more on that some time later.

Next time you see a new padel court in your neighbourhood, you may ask yourself—why did it happen?

What do you notice about sports with respect to your environment in general?

Further Reading

• Matušíková, D., Švedová, M., Dzurov Vargová, T., & Żegleń, P. (2020). An Analysis of the „European City of Sports” Project and its Impact on the Development of Tourist Activity: The Example of Selected Slovakian Cities. Turyzm/Tourism, 30(1), 61–70. [Link]

• Teixeira, M. C., Mamede, N. B., Seguí-Urbaneja, J., & Sesinando, A. D. (2023). European Cities of Sport as a Strategic Policy for Local Development of Sports: A Perspective from Sports Management in the Last Decade. Physical Culture and Sport. Studies and Research, 103(1), 28–43. [Link]

Footnotes

This article is in Czech. Looking for English content? Explore it [here].

Je léto, polovina lidí leží u vody nebo u moře, ta druhá právě sesedá ze sedla u nejbližší pivní občerstvovačky. A ta třetí doma balí na dovolenou.

Sport zasáhne snad každého, ať už aktivně, nebo pasivně. Je nezanedbatelnou součástí kultury. Zákon č. 115/2001 Sb., o podpoře sportu, ho definuje jako veřejně prospěšnou činnost poskytovanou v celospolečenském zájmu. Na státu, krajích a obcích je pak rozhodnutí, jakou činnost a komu ji budou poskytovat. Sport přitom veřejný statek z přesné definice být nemůže, i když místy některé parametry splňuje.

Rivalita, vylučitelnost a proč na tom záleží

Veřejné statky se v ekonomii typicky vyznačují nevylučitelností (nikdo nemůže být vyloučen z užívání) a nerivalitností (užívání jedním člověkem nesnižuje dostupnost pro ostatní).

Nicméně velká část sportovní spotřeby je vylučitelná. V bazénu si zkrátka bez zaplacení nezaplavete, i když je podporován z rozpočtu města. Členství ve sportovním oddílu většinou zadarmo není, i když je oproti tržní ceně snížené díky čerpání (místy nepřehledných) dotací. S nerivalitností je to také obtížnější. Na zdánlivě nevylučitelném užívání cyklostezky se v letních dnech krásně ukazuje rivalita všech těch běžců, kočárků, bruslařů a nemluvě o cyklistech.

Jak tedy maximalizovat to pomyslné společenské blaho včetně všech nezapočítaných zdravotních a sociálních benefitů nebo multiplikačních efektů v ekonomice? Zásahem co největšího počtu lidí (sportovců)?

Formy podpory sportu s sebou totiž nesou různé mezní náklady vzhledem k míře zmíněné vylučitelnosti a rivality. Ve zkratce — každý další cyklista na cyklostezce nestojí prakticky nic, financování dalšího vrcholového sportovce-reprezentanta už ano.

Co by tedy mělo být naším cílem v otázce stanovení sportovního optima? Podle mikroekonomie ze středních škol:

Příkladem budiž trenéři

Snaha o ekonomickou kalkulaci dopadla tak, jak dopadla, a stále dopadá tak, jak dopadá. Vzhledem k pozitivním externalitám sportu a četným dotačním schématům je těžké narazit na čistě volný sportovní „trh,“ na kterém by bylo možné představit problematiku odhadování těchto externalit.

Příkladem mohou být ale služby osobních trenérů (na které se snížená DPH ve výši 12 % nevztahuje a “nenarušuje” tak trh ještě více). Ekonomické náklady osobních trenérů na dalšího svěřence s sebou nesou:

• časové náklady samotného tréninku → ve stejné výši pro každého dalšího,

• časové náklady na přípravu na trénink → klesající mezní náklady vzhledem ke zkušenostem,

• vybavení, afiliace s posilovnou, klubem → fixní vstupní náklady.

Osobní trenér přitom v jednu chvíli nezvládne odtrénovat neomezený počet lidí. Jeho služby jsou tak vylučitelné a svým způsobem i rivalitní, jelikož zvýšený počet trénovaných sportovců snižuje pozornost trenéra na každého z nich.

A teď ty společenské benefity

Trenér má dvě možnosti – kvalitu nebo kvantitu. Například trenér běhu může v rámci dvou hodin vést:

1. kurz pro 40 kondičních běžců a každému z nich se věnovat alespoň malou chvíli,

2. mít pod sebou úzkou skupinu dospívajících sportovců v atletickém klubu, nebo

3. trénovat pouze jednoho nebo dva profesionály.

Každý z těchto trenérů věnuje stejně času na přípravu. Jaký trenér přispívá společenskému blahobytu nejvíce? Teď přichází to oblíbené: Záleží.

Co když jeden z těch čtyřiceti kondičních běžců je člen představenstva místní firmy, kterého kladný vztah ke sportu přesvědčí o zvýšení soukromé podpory pro sportovní kluby ve městě? Nebo nejlépe – co když každý z těch čtyřiceti běžců dokáže svým nadšením pro sport inspirovat své děti?

Co když profesionální běžec dokáže svými výkony a veřejným vystupováním zvednout ze židle polovinu národa? Často lze tento efekt pozorovat po úspěšné olympiádě.

Kalkulace benefitů a priori je složitá, a tím i stanovení nabídkové ceny za službu trenéra.

Kvůli nedokonalosti informací proto obecně vznikají ve sportu tržní propasti, které se pomocí smíšené ekonomiky snažíme vyplnit tam, kde si myslíme, že vznikne největší všeobecné dobro – nebo tam, kde se to někomu prostě více hodí.

S každou další investicí do sportu totiž platí, že někde pravděpodobně existuje pro danou investici lepší využití. Nebo možná ne, a to je jedině dobře. Záleží, jestli jsou na obou stranách rovnice správně znaménka.

Další čtení a reference

1. Andreff, W., & Szymanski, S. (2006). Introduction: Sport and economics. In W. Andreff & S. Szymanski (Eds.), Handbook on the Economics of Sport (pp. 1–8). Edward Elgar Publishing. Dostupné zde: [odkaz]

2. Deloitte Česká republika (2025). Studie ekonomického dopadu pohybových aktivit v ČR. Dostupné zde: [odkaz]

3. Dittrichová, J. (2010). Financování sportu jako veřejného statku. In: National and Regional Economics VIII, International Conference, Technical University of Košice. ISBN 978-80-553-0517-2. Dostupné zde: [odkaz]

4. NKÚ (2024). Tisková zpráva: Očekávané přínosy vzniku Národní sportovní agentury nebyly naplněny: miliardové dotace netransparentní a bez kontroly efektivity. Dostupné zde: [odkaz]

5. Zákon č. 115/2001 Sb. o podpoře sportu. Dostupné z: [odkaz]

Na Škváře bych rád na sport nahlížel trochu z jiného úhlu a třeba společně přijdeme na to, kde v českém sportovním prostředí fungují investice do něj lépe a kde naopak.

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